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In this paper we consider the one-way function fg,N(X) = gx (mod N), where N is a Blum 
integer. We prove that under the commonly assumed intractability of factoring Blum integers, 
all its bits are individually hard, and the lower as well as upper halves of them are 
simultaneously hard. As a result, fg,N can be used in efficient pseudo-random bit generators 
and multi-bit commitment schemes, where messages can be drawn according to arbitrary 
probability distributions. 0 1993 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A function f(x) is one-way if it is easy to compute but hard to invert. One-way 
functions have numerous cryptographic applications in public-key cryptosystems, 
pseudo-random bit generation, commitment schemes, and so on. Several explicit 
constructions of one-way functions have been suggested under some plausible 
number-theoretic assumptions. One such candidate is the exponentiation function 
f&X) = gX (mod P), where P is a prime and g is a generator of Z,* [BM]. Its 
inverse is the discrete logarithm function, for which no efficient algorithms have 
been found. Another problem that is considered to be highly intractable is that of 
factoring a number which is the product of two large primes. Among the one-way 
functions that are based on the difficulty of factoring are the RSA/Rabin functions 
[RSA, Ra]. 
An interesting property of one-way functions is the existence of hard bits in the 
argument which cannot be computed by any family of polynomial-size Boolean 
circuits with $+ l/poly probability of success. Blum and Micali [BM] were first to 
introduce the notion of hard bits and to demonstrate its importance to pseudo- 
random number generation. This notion was extensively investigated in the early 
198Os, culminating in proofs that some specific bits in the number theoretic 
candidates for one-way functions (usually the most significant or the least signifi- 
* Supported by Swedish board for technical development. 
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cant O(log n) bits of the n-bit argument) are individually hard [BM, ACGS] and 
that those O(log n) bits are also simultaneously hard [LW, VV, ACGS]. All the 
subsequent efforts to extend the techniques to prove the individual or simultaneous 
hardness of O(n) bits in these number theoretic functions failed. 
Goldreich and Levin [GL] have shown that for every one-way function there is 
a logarithmic number of one-bit predicates that are hard, given the value of the 
function. Extending their result to prove that more bits are hard without imposing 
any assumptions on the one-way function is claimed to be impossible, since a func- 
tion may be one-way and still depend only on a small fraction of its bits. Explicit 
constructions of one-way functions for which all the bits are simultaneously hard do 
exist, but they rely on the composition of individually hard bits from many one-way 
functions (rather than on a single application of a natural function, e.g., in the 
probabilistic encryption functions of [GM, BG]). 
Besides its theoretical significance, proving a one-way function to have many 
simultaneously hard bits can improve the efficiency of many cryptographic schemes. 
Very recently Impagliazzo and Naor [IN] have introduced an efficient pseudo- 
random bit generator based on the combinatorial one-way function corresponding 
to the subset sum problem. Their novel construction makes it possible to obtain 
O(n) pseudo-random output bits from each application of the function on random 
inputs, but does not necessarily imply that the input bits of the function are 
individually or simultaneously hard, leaving the problem of constructing a natural 
function with O(n) hard bits open. 
In this paper we consider the natural one-way function fg,N(X) = gX (mod N), 
where N is a Blum integer. We prove that under the sole assumption that factoring 
Blum integers is difficult, all its bits are individually hard, and the lower and upper 
halves of them are simultaneously hard. As a result, ,f,,,, can be used in efficient 
pseudo-random bit generators with O(n)-bit output per stage and in multi-bit 
commitment schemes, in which the messages can be drawn according to arbitrary 
probability distributions. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give the various definitions 
and assumptions used. In Section 3 we deal with the individual bits hardness of fg,N 
and in Section 4 we deal with the simultaneous bit hardness. We present some 
applications of our enhanced security results in Section 5 and we discuss several 
extensions of our work in Section 6. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Let N = P. Q, where P, Q are distinct odd primes, and let n be the binary size of 
N. Let Z$ be the multiplicative group containing the integers in [ 1, N] that are 
relatively prime to N. The order of an element g E Zz, ord,( g), is the smallest c 2 1 
such that g’ = 1 (mod N). We denote max,, zk {ord,( g)} by 0,. Clearly, 
O,=lcm(P-l,Q-1)6 (P- lM- 1) 
2 ’ 
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We refer to any element ge Z$ as a generator despite the fact that no g can 
generate all the elements in Z,$ for N which is the product of two odd primes. 
DEFINITION. For a given g let G c Z,$ be the set of elements generated by it, i.e., 
G = {Z ( there exists XE ZE s.t. Z = gX (mod N)j. 
Note that the number of elements in G equals ordN(g). 
DEFINITION. Fix a constant k. A /zig/r order g is an element for which 
ord,(g)>-$.(P- l)(Q- 1). 
A careful counting argument, for which we gratefully acknowledge Noga Alon, 
shows that a substantial fraction of the elements in Z$ have high order: 
PROPOSITION 1. Let P and Q be randomly chosen primes of equal size, N = P. Q 
with binary size n, and g a randomly chosen element in Z;, then V k 2 4, 
Proof: 
Pr ord,(g)<$.(P- l)(Q- 1) 
> 
<Pr O,< 
( 
-&- (WQ- 11) 
+Pr ord,(g)<-$.O, 
( > 
for every k’ < k. 
By definition ordN(g) = lcm(ord,(g), ordo(g Since ord,(g) I (P - 1) and 
ordo I (Q- l), let ord,(g) = (P- 1 I/ a, orda( g) = (Q - 1)/p. Clearly, lcm( (P- 1 )/IX, 
(Q- 1)/p) 2 lcm(P- 1, Q- l)/lcm(u., fi) 2 0,/a/?. Therefore, if ordp(g) 2 (P- l)/nk’12 
and ordo(g)2(Q-1)/n k’12 then ordN(g) 2 O,/nk’. We next use the following two 
combinatorial lemmas and by choosing k’ = (4k - lo)/5 to minimize the resulting 
expression the proposition follows. 
LEMMA 1.1. For randomly chosen primes of equal size, P and Q, let N = P. Q and 
n = rlog NJ: 
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LEMMA 1.2. Let P be a randomly chosen prime of size m: 
ord,(g)<-$(P-1) 
Proof of Lemma 1.1. O,=lcm(P-1,Q-1)=(P-1)(Q-1)/gcd(P-1,Q-1). 
Hence to prove the lemma we need to show that: 
Pr(gcd(P - 1, Q - 1) > n’) < 0( l/rrp3). 
Let m = [n/21 denote the binary size of P and Q. Let X= 2” - 1. We shall first 
examine the sum of the gcd of all pairs of m-bit numbers: xx,* G R,, R1 $ x gcd(R, , R,). 
Obviously every integer 2 <b <X can appear in this sum at most X2/4b times. 
Therefore, 
c 
x 1 x* 
X/~<RI,R~<X 
gcd(R,,R,)< C ---$logx.;. 
bd 4 
We are interested in R,, R, of the form P - 1, Q - 1, where P and Q are primes. 
As the density of primes in the interval [X/2, X] is known to be O(X/log X) (by 
an extension of Heath-Brown to the prime numbers theorem [HB, GK]), the 
lemma follows 1 
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Let g be an element in Z;. It is well known that the order 
of any element of a group divides the order of the group, and that the number of 
elements of order d is exactly d(d), where q5( .) is the Euler function. Thus, for any 
prime P of binary size m, 
g:ord,(g)<-$.(P-1) 
= c d(d) d c d. 
dl P-l;d<(l/m’)(P-1) dl P--l;d<(l/m’)(P-1) 
For any m-bit number Y, let F(Y) denote the sum of all the divisors of Y that are 
smaller than l/m’. Y, i.e., F(Y) = Cd, ,,, dC I,ml. y d. We shall first bound the sum of 
F(Y) over all m-bit numbers: C$_,, F(Y), with X=2”- 1. It is easy to see that 
any number d < X/m’ is summed up as a divisor at most 1 + X/(2d) times. Hence, 
f F(Y)< 
Y=XJ2 
d<($,x (%+ 1)) .d=O (3 
Note that for any PE [X/2, Xl, 
ord,(g)<il.(P- 1) 
> 
<PPr F(P-l)>--$.X +--$ 
> 
for every I’ < 1. 
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To estimate Pr(F(P- 1) 3 l/m”. X) we use our bound on the sum of F(Y), 
together with the fact that O(X/log X) of the Y’s in the interval are of the form 
P- 1. It is easy to see that 
Pr 
( 
F(P-l)>--$.X <O(m”-‘+I). 
> 
By choosing I’ = (Z- 1)/2, the lemma follows. [ 
DEFINITION. Let ge Zz. For every integer X the exponentiation module a 
composite function is defined by 
fg,N WI = gx (mod N). 
Its inverse, the discrete logarithm modulo a composite, is defined only for ZE G by 
for the unique X<ord,(g) s.t. Z=f,,N(X). 
Note that while the values of fg,.,, range from 1 to N, f,rk outputs only values 
up to ord,(g) which is strictly smaller than N. 
The following is a list of the assumptions that are used throughout this paper. 
Unless otherwise mentioned, we shall assume that all these assumptions hold, even 
though some of our results can be derived without some of them (as will be 
mentioned later). 
Assumption a.1. P and Q are of equal size. This assumption is commonly used 
in cryptography, and is believed to strengthen the intractability of factorization. 
Assumption a.2. P = Q = 3 (mod 4). If the assumption holds, every square in Zz 
has exactly one square root that is also a square. Hence, squaring is a permutation 
of the quadratic residues. 
The numbers N = P Q for which both assumptions hold are called Blum integers. 
Assumption a.3. g is a quadratic residue. We refer to any g for which Assump- 
tion a.3 holds as an admissible generator. Note that Proposition 1 holds even if we 
restrict N to be a Blum integer and g to be an admissible generator. 
Intractability Assumption [Y]. No family of polynomial-size Boolean circuits 
can factor a polynomial feaction of the Blum integers. 
All our assumptions and results use the non-uniform approach to complexity, i.e., 
are stated in terms of polynomial-size Boolean circuits. However, most of them can 
be stated, without any changes, in terms of probabilistic polynomial-time 
algorithms. The only case, where an adjustment is required, is in the proof of 
Theorem 7. as indicated there. 
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Notations. For a number U let u,, . . . . u1 denote the binary representation of U, 
with u, being the most significant bit and ur being the least significant bit. Note 
that the most significant bit always refers to the n th bit in the binary representa- 
tion, even when U is known to be smaller than 2”. A substring uk, . . . . uj of u,, . . . . ui 
(1 < j < k < n) will be denoted by r.4;. We use the notation f < O(v(n)) for any func- 
tion that vanishes faster than any polynomial, i.e., for every polynomial poly(n) and 
n large enough f < l/poly(n). 
DEFINITION. An admissible triplet (g, N, Z) is such that: 
1. N is a Blum integer. 
2. g is an admissible generator. 
3. ZEG. 
The collection of admissible triplets can be efficiently sampled with uniform 
probability distribution; i.e., it is possible to pick a random uniformly distributed 
admissible triplet using a polynomial amount of resources (time, random bits). 
DEFINITION. The function f,, N is a one-way function if for every family C of 
polynomial-size Boolean circuits, 
Pr(f;,h(Z) = C(Z)) G O(v(n)h 
where the probability is induced by a uniform probability distribution of the 
admissible triplets (g, N, Z). 
A well-known result [Bal, Ch] is 
THEOREM 2. Under the intrcatability assumption, the exponentiation modulo a 
Blum integer, fg,N(X), is a one-way function. 
Proof: We present the simple proof of this theorem as it demonstrates some of 
the basic techniques that are crucial for our results. We establish that it is possible 
to plant a short yet hard secret inside the argument of fg,N and use that fact 
extensively in the sequel. Define Y = gN (mod N) = f,,,( N). Let S = f;b( Y) = 
N- d. ord,(g), where d is the largest multiple of ord,( g) for which S’ is non- 
negative. The following key lemma proves that S is extremely small. 
LEMMA 2.1. IfordN(g)>/P+Q-1, then S=P+Q-1. Otherwise, S<P+Q-1. 
Proof. It is well known that for any gEZ$: ord,(g) 1 ON. Since O,= 
lcm(P- l)(Q- I), 0, ( (P- l)(Q- 1) and, therefore, ord,(g) ) (P- l)(Q- 1). 
Assume now that ord,(g) >, P+ Q - 1. In that case it is easy to see that 
(P - 1 )(Q - 1) is the largest multiple of ord,( g), which is still not greater than 
N:(P-l)(Q-l)<N, but (P-l)(Q-l)+ord,(g)=N-(P+Q-l)+ord,(g)>N. 
Therefore, by definition, S=N-d.ord,(g)=N-(P-l)(Q-l)=(P+Q-1). 
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For g such that ord,(g)<P+Q-1, we obtain S<ord,(g)<P+Q-1, which 
completes the proof of the lemma. 
Assume that f,, N is not a one-way function; i.e., there esists a family C of polyno- 
mial-size Boolean circuits that computes f,;;(Z) successfully on a non-negligible 
fraction of the Blum integers N, the generators g E Zj$, and the elements Z E G. We 
use C to factor a non-negligible fraction of the Blum integers, thus contradicting the 
intractability assumption. Let N be some random Blum integer and g a random 
generator in Z,?J for which C computes f,;(Z) successfully on a non-negligible 
fraction of Z E G. For such N and g we use C to compute S by applying standard 
randomization techniques on Y (i.e., trying out sufficiently many inputs to C of the 
form Y. gR for an appropriate choice of a random R). Subsequently we try to 
factor N using S: If ord,(g) 2 P + Q - 1 (which by Proposition 1 is likely to 
happen), then S = (P + Q - 1). Hence, by solving the two equations: S= P + Q - 1 
and N = P. Q we obtain the full factorization of N. 1 
Let JSI denote the binary size of S. As we have proved that S is extremely small, 
it is important to note that its size is very small too: 
COROLLARY 2.1. 
ISI < f + 1. H 
3. THE HARD BITS OF fg,,,(x) 
DEFINITION H.l. The ith bit of the function fg,,, is hard if no family of polyno- 
mial-size Boolean circuits can, given a random uniformly distributed admissible 
triplet (g, N, Z), compute the ith bit of f,;;(Z) with probability of success greater 
than f+ l/poly(n), for any polynomial poly(n). 
Note that we use the direct delinition of hardness (as in [BM]) rather than 
defining a bit to the hard if its approximation is as hard as computing f,i (as in 
CLWI 1. 
Proving the hardness of the O(log n) most significant bits of fg,N calls for a new 
definition of hardness for bits that are a priori known to be biased (and therefore 
can be trivially predicted with probability greater that $), as the above well-known 
definition of hardness is valid only for unbiased bits. Let xi be the ith input bit of 
the function fg,N and denote its bias towards zero by b(i). Note that only for 
i > n - O(log n) the bias is significantly greater than 5, yet the definition we will give 
is valid for any bias. In particular it implies Definition H.l for non-biased bits 
(b(i) = 4). In [SSl] it is shown that the natural extension of Definition H.l to 
biased bits is incorrect and several alternative definitions are presented. Following 
this work we define: 
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DEFINITION. The weighted success rate of any family C of polynomial-size 
Boolean circuits in predicting xi is 
ws(C, ii)=&-Pr(C(g, N, Z)=xi 1 C=O) 
1 
+ 1 -b(i) 
-----.Pr(C(g, N, Z)=xi ( C= 1). 
To make the conditional probabilities well defined we must require C to be non- 
constant, i.e., output 0 and 1 with probabilities greater than zero. As is explained 
in [SSl] this does not detract from the generality of the definition, since a constant 
circuit can only discover deviations from the overall bias. 
DEFINITION H.2. The ith bit of the function fg,N, xi, is hard if for every family 
C of polynomial-size Boolean circuits that is given a random admissible triplet 
k, N Z), 
ws(C, Xi) < 2 + O(v(n)). 
THEOREM 3. Under the intractability assumption, for every 1 < i < n the ith bit of 
f g, N is hard. 
Proof: Overview. Suppose that for a certain i, the ith bit is not hard. For non- 
biased bits (i < n - O(log n)) by Definition H.l there exists a polynomial-size oracle 
(circuit) C: (g, N, Z) + (0, 1 } (where (g, N, Z) is an admissible triplet) that suc- 
ceeds with probability exceeding 4 + l/n’, for some constant c, in predicting the ith 
bit of f,;(Z). As in Theorem 2 let Y = g”’ (mod N). We use the oracle to factor N, 
by computing all the bits of S = f$ ( Y) and following the reduction of Theorem 2. 
In the following we discuss the general techniques and procedures that are 
implemented in performing the extraction of S using C. Dealing with the most 
significant (possibly biased) bits of fg,,N imposes several additional difficulties that 
are of a less general nature. This analysis of the hardness of the biased bits is given 
in full in the proof of Proposition 3.4. 
Intuitively, we can regard an oracle for the ith bit as a one-bit window into the 
ith position in a long unknown sequence of bits of S. By moving the sequence 
underneath the window, we can see everything in it. We therefore need a method 
to shift the unknown S to the right and to the left, by operating on the known Y. 
We should be careful not to cause a wraparound (i.e., a reduction of the shifted S 
modulo the unknown ordN(g)), by zeroing some known bits of S while operating 
on Y. The shifts to the left result essentially from squaring Y. We cannot perform 
the shifts to the right by extracting square roots of Y, since that cannot be done in 
polynomial time when the factorization of N is unknown. Instead we develop a 
special technique by which the right shifts result from changing the base g of the 
exponentiation function and using the fact that squaring modulo a Blum integer is 
a permutation over the (randomly chosen) admissible generators. 
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As the oracle may err, one peek through the window in not enough. We “collect 
votes” on the value of the ith bit by quering the oracle on polynomially many 
random multiples of the original input and use a majority vote to decide the value. 
To perform this randomization we have to guess an estimate of the unknown 
ord,(g) as an upper bound on the random choices, thus preventing the occurrence 
of a wraparound. Since the multiplication involves the addition of the known 
exponent of the random value with the unknown argument of fg,,,, we should 
handle with care the unknown carry into the ith bit position from the addition of 
their least significant i- 1 bits. We solve the problem by guessing the value of a 
logarithmic number of bits right to the ith bit and zeroing them. A straightforward 
implementation of this guessing strategy for each bit position leads to an 
exponential algorithm, but a more careful implementation can make sure that only 
a polynomial number of candidates for the value of S exist. 
We begin the proof with a detailed description of the bit-zeroing, shifting, and 
randomization techniques, which provide us with the necessary tools for extracting 
S. We then separate the proof into four possible cases and show: 
1. The middle bits (rn/21 - O(logn) 6 i < [n/21 + O(log n)) are hard 
(Proposition 3.1). 
2. Every bit to the right of the middle (1 d i< rn/21- U(log n)) is hard 
(Proposition 3.2). 
3. Every non-biased bit to the left of the middle ([n/21 + O(log n),<i< 
n - O(log n) is hard (Proposition 3.3). 
4. The O(log n) most significant bits of fg,N are hard (Proposition 3.4). 
The actual extraction of S in this theorem involves two possible procedures. The 
simpler is the forward-extract procedure, where the unknown bits of S are com- 
puted from the right (least significant) to the left. The more complicated is the 
backward-extract procedure, where the bits are discovered from the left to the right. 
We describe both procedures in detail while proving Proposition 3.1. We use a 
simplified version of Procedure Forward-Extract in the proof of Proposition 3.2. 
A very careful application of Procedure Backward-Extract is required for the proofs 
of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. All our procedures and proofs are valid for every choice 
of O(log n). 
Assumptions a.2 and a.3 on P, Q, and g are required to enable performing the 
general right shifts technique that we develop. However, as we shall demonstrate, 
the use of this technique is necessary only when the oracle is located to the right 
of the middle. As a result Propositions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 can be strengthened to hold 
without Assumptions a.2 and a.3. 
We shall henceforth assume that the randomly chosen g is of high order and 
perform our analysis accoringly. Let tl be any constant such that (a - 5)/5 > c + 1. 
We assume that 
ord,(g)>$.(P- l)(Q-- 1). 
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The probability that g is not of high order is, by Proposition 1, O(l/n’“-5”5) and 
since the oracle has an overall l/n’ advantage in predicting correctly the ith bit of 
fg,,, (for any g), by our choice of a it has at least a ;nC advantage in predicting 
correctly the ith bit for high order g’s. We express most quantities in terms of c(, 
even when smaller quantities can be used. 
In many of our procedures we need a fairly accurate guess on the order of g. 
Since all we need is a logarithmic number of significant digits, we can try all 
possibilities and still remain in polynomial time. Let o,, . . . . o, be the binary 
representation of ord,(g) and let o, be the leftmost non-zero bit of ord,(g). We 
assume from now on that we know the value of m and of o,,_, for 
j = I, . . . . r0l i0g nl. 
Main Techniques. Let V = f,,,( U), for U < ordN (g). Note that the n - m - 1 
most significant bits of U are zero, i.e., uj = 0 for m + 1 6 j d n. 
Bit-zeroing technique. The operation of zeroing a known jth bit of U (while 
operating on I’) is denoted by ZRj (g, V). It is easy to see that 
ZRj (g, V) = V. g--U,.“-’ (mod N). 
Shifting techniques. Shifting to the left. Assume we are guaranteed that u, = 0, 
and we know u, _, . We shift the sequence of bits u,,- , , . . . . u1 one bit to the left, 
while zeroing the new m th bit of the shifted U, by using the knowledge of m and 
u,,,- i to transform V into (ZR,_ 1( g, V))’ (mod N). We cancel u,- I to prevent the 
shifted value of U from becoming greater than ord,(g) and causing an overflow, 
which will entirely change the value of U by subtracting from it ord,(g). 
Shifting to the right. We can shift the sequence of bits representing U one bit 
to the right, with the known least significant bit falling off, by transforming V into 
dm (mod NJ, un d er an appropriate choice of one of the four possible square 
roots. However, square roots modulo N are not known to be efficiently computed 
without knowledge of the factorization of N, so se have to compute it in an indirect 
way. 
Assume now that g was not arbitrarily chosen, but created by squaring mod N 
another admissible generator g’. Let V’ = fg,,N (U). Using the knowledge of V’ and 
of the least significant bit of U we obtain 
shifted U= f,k(ZR,(g’, V’)). 
AS V’ depends on U, if U is unknown, V’ is also unknown. However, since we only 
use the technique to obtain shifts of S = f ,.$ ( Y) for Y = f,, N (N), it is easy to derive 
Y’ = fgC,N(S) via Y’ = fg,,N(N). 
Observe that we only use g’ to calculate square roots. All the queries to the 
oracle are with respect to the same original g. 
We can use this method to perform a bounded number of shifts to the right. In 
order to perform at most k shifts to the right, we prepare in advance the sequence: 
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{ gi}rzd, where gj = g,‘- 1 (mod N) and use g = gk+ 1 as the base of the exponentia- 
tion function. Since squaring is a permutation of the quadratic residues modulo a 
Blum integer N, a random choice of g, will produce a random admissible g for 
any k. 
Randomization technique. To extract the value of ui we query the oracle on 
t(n) =n2c+3 inputs of the form (g, N, V. gR) for randomly chosen n-bit 
R = rn , . . . . r , , such that 0 < R < ord,(g). We then determine the value of ui by a 
majority vote. Two main problems arise: 
1. Despite our knowledge of R, we cannot know whether a carry from the 
addition of the i - 1 least significant bits of the known R and the unknown U effects 
the i th bit of the sum, and thus we cannot infer ui from the answers of the oracle 
for the i th bit. If, on the other hand, we were guaranteed that 
uiL 19 ..7 ui- rr log ,I] = OOO...O, we could discard the possibility of a carry except in the 
low probability event that r,- , , . . . . rip Tx ,OL: ,,, = lli... 1 (whose probability is at most 
l/n”). As the actual values of ui- , , . . . . u,+ Tb logn, are unknown, we try out all their 
(polynomial number of) possible values. For each value we act as if it was the 
correct value, zero it, and compute the unknown bit ui accordingly. Our procedures 
for the extraction of S make sure that the ambiguity concerning its value remains 
polynomial, so that an exhaustive search can find the correct value. 
2. As the exact value of ordN(g) is unknown and cannot be computed 
in polynomial time, we use an approximation e = er2, . . ..e. of ord,( g) to enable a 
sufficiently random choice of R: 
i 
0, for m-rd0gf216j~n ei = 
0 otherwise. 
PROPOSITION 3.1. Under the intractability assumption, for every i: [n/21 - 
O(log n) d i< [n/21 + O(log n) the i th bit of fg,,, is hard. 
ProoJ Assume that for some [n/21 - O(log n) < i < rn/21+ O(log n), the ith bit 
is not hard. Remember that S = f ,h(f,,N(N)) and CI > 5c + 10, where l/nC is the 
advantage of the oracle. We extract the half-sized secret S by using the following 
method: 
THE FORWARD-EXTRACT PROCEDURE. 1. Shift S rn/2l-[a lognl bits to the 
left. This will not cause a wraparound by our assumption on the order of g. For 
each of the (polynomial number of) guesses of the i - rn/21+ [a log nl least signifi- 
cant bits of S, which have not passed under the oracle’s location, do the following 
stages. (For i< rn/21 -[a log nl there is no need to guess any bits. See the proof 
of Proposition 3.2 for further discussion). 
2. Zero these guessed bits to prevent any carry into the oracle’s location during 
the randomization. 
3. Let Y’ denote Y after the transformations of previous stages. Let sj be the bit 
that is currently at the oracle’s location. Deduce sj by quering the oracle on t(n) 
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random multiples I”. gR (mod N), for random R < e (see previous discussion of 
randomization technique), and zero it. 
4. Shift S one bit back to the right, placing Sj+ 1 at the oracle’s location. The right 
shifts may be performed directly since S is located to the left of its original location. 
(See the following note.) 
5. Repeat stages 3-4 until S reaches its initial position, to extract all bits, sj, for 
max(i-rn/21+r~l0gnl, l}GjGi. 
6. For i < [n/21 + 1 guess the [n/21 + 1 - i leftmost non-zero bits.of S that have 
not passed under the oracle’s location. 
7. Output the values obtained for S. 
The correct value of S among the resulting candidates from the procedure is 
chosen by trying to factor N with each computed S. 
Note. The shifts to the right in the above procedure move S back at most to its 
initial position but not further to the right. Therefore it is possible to perform the 
right shifts directly without using the general shift to the right technique. An 
efficient implementation of these right shifts involves saving the intermediate results 
of the initial shifts to the left and reusing them. The same holds also for all the other 
procedures that are used when the oracle is located left of the middle. For this 
reason, Propositions 3.1, as well as 3.3 and 3.4 can be strengthened to hold without 
Assumptions a.2 and a.3, as we have already indicated. 
The following scheme illustrates the position of S during the procedure, given an 
oracle for the (rn/21+ 1)th bit. We denote an unknown value of a bit by a question 
mark. All bits that are known a priori to be zero are denoted by a zero. Bits of S 
that were discovered or assigned values and subsequently zeroed are denoted by an 
exclamation mark. The oracle’s location is indicated by a box: 
Before the procedure begins: 
7 . . . . . . . 
” I 
After stages 1,2: -I ,ralog~l n 
7 . . . . . . . !!d . . . 0 . . . " 1 
During the procedure (stages 3-6): 
n 
Finally: 
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Since each of the guesses in Procedure Forward-Extract yields a unique value for 
S, it is easy to see that: 
CLAIM 1.1. The procedure yields at most 21’-r”‘21+ ‘I .2r3’ogn1 = no(‘) possible 
values for S. 
CLAIM 1.2. With probability greater than sZ( l/n’) one of the output values is the 
correct value of S. 
Proof: Consider the following two conditions: 
1. For the particular choice of N and g, the probability (over R) that the 
oracle gives the correct answer is at least l/2 + 1/2n”. 
2. The order of g is at least N/n’. 
We claim that whenever these two conditions are satisfied a correct value of S will 
be derived with a probability that is exponentially close to one. We leave this 
routine verification to the reader. 
Now observe that since the overall probability that the oracle is correct is 
$ + l/n’ the probability (over g and N) that (1) will happen is at least 1/2n’. On 
the other hand, by Proposition 1 and our choice of a we know that the probability 
of (2) not happening is at most l/n”+’ and the claim follows. 
From the preceding claims it follows that: 
CLAIM 1.3. The above procedure can be used to factor a non-negligible fraction of 
the Blum integers with an overwhelming probability of success, by trying random 
admissible g ‘2. 
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1. However, we now present an alter- 
native proof using a different procedure, called Procedure Backward-Extract. Each 
of the two proof techniques will be required when we extend Proposition 3.1 to bits 
other than the middle bits. In Procedure Backward-Extract the bits of S are dis- 
covered from the most significant bit to the least significant bit. The main property 
of the procedure (which makes it essential for the proofs dealing with the left bits) 
is that, at any stage of its application, all the bits left of the oracle’s location are 
known. The following version of the procedure is directly applicable in Propo- 
sition 3.1, where the oracle’s location is logarithmically close to the middle 
and is modified to work for all bits to the left of the middle (see the proofs of 
Propositions 3.3 and 3.4). 
Let i=min(rn/21+ 1, i}, and let 0 denote concatenation. The following is a 
description of Procedure Backward-Extract: 
THE BACKWARD-EXTRACT PROCEDURE. 1. For i > rn/21+ 1 shift S i- rn/21- 1 
bits to the left. 
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2. Create a list L, of the possible candidates for si based on any guess of the 
rcc log nl right bits that are adjacent to it. For all possible guesses k = 0, . . . . 2ra’ogn1 
of the bits sip r, . . . . si--ra,ogn,, do: 
(a) Zero these guessed bits (with the original Y transformed to Y”,) 
(b) Query the oracle on t(n) random multiples YE. gR (mod N), for 
random R < e. 
(c) Use a majority vote to deduce the current guess for si and denote it 
by CS:. 
3. Let si-j be the bit that is currently evaluated. Shift S j bits to the left 
placing sidi at the oracle’s location. Unlike the general shift to the left technique 
(and for reasons that will soon become clear), perform the left shifts without 
zeroing the discovered bits. Let Yj denote the resulting Y. 
4. Let L, be the list containing the candidates values for the j left bits of S: 
csi,, . ..) csi,,. log n,. Let b = 0. Create a new list L,, , in the following manner: For all 
possible values k = 0, . . . . 2’” log “l do: 
(a) If CSi, exists in the list L,, let u = k\a’ognl-’ 0 b. 
(b) Zero si--/-l, -., Si-j-rulognl according to u, transforming Yj into Yi,. 
Deduce siej by querying the oracle on t(n) random multiples Yj, . gR 
(mod N), for R < e. 
(c) Check whether the resulting value of siMj equals kralogn, (which is the 
value that has been assigned to that bit while creating CSi,). If so, enter 
the value CSi+ ’ = CSi, 0 siej into Lj+ 1. 
(d) Otherwise, repeat stages (b) and (c) with v = k\“‘“gnlp ’ 0 (1 -b). 
5. Repeat stages 3-4 to extract all bits, siej, max{ i + rc! log nl - 
rn/21-1, ij~i-j~i. 
6. For i < [n/21 + 1 guess the [n/21 + 1 -i leftmost non-zero bits of S that 
have not passed under the oracle’s location. For i > rn/21+ 1 - [cl log nl guess the 
i + ra log nl - [n/21 - 1 rightmost bit of S that have not passed under the oracle’s 
location. 
In the above process we initially create a list L1 of the possible candidates for si 
based on any guess of the ra log nl right bits that are adjacent to it. As we proceed, 
we create a new list Lj containing the candidate values for the j left bits of S out 
of the existing list Lie r, by following stage 4. From a rough analysis of the proce- 
dure it seems possible for each candidate value CSi, to be extended in two different 
ways (by concatenating both Si-j= 0 and siPi= 1 to its right). This seemingly 
doubles the length of the list in every stage and causes an exponential blowup in 
the number of candidate values. In fact, every candidate value CSi, is uniquely 
determined by j and k: Since we perform the left shifts without zeroing the bits that 
were discovered, all the different trials for the evaluation of siPi are done on the 
571/47/3-z 
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same transformed value of Y, Y’. Thus a certain candidate CS;’ ’ (with 
u= k\a’ognl-’ ob) can be generated either from candidate value CS: with 
k r0lh ni = 1 or from a candidate value with kyElogn, = 0, but not from both. 
Repeating this argument we see that each string CSL has a unique extension to the 
right. It is therefore easy to see that Claims 1.1-l .3 hold for Procedure Backward- 
Extract as well. 
Observe that it is crucial to this uniqueness argument that we do not zero the 
bits that have passed under the oracle’s location, and therefore stage 4 is performed 
for the same shifted S (i.e., the same Yj). Consider, for example, two candidate 
values: CSi,,,.,, and CS&,. While performing stage 4 for these two values 
k\a’ognl-l=O...O, so that we try the same values for v (v=O...OO or v=O...Ol) 
twice. Obviously, for every value of v we have a single value of sipi which 
corresponds only to one of the two candidate values. As a result only two values 
(and not four) will be included in Li+ , . 
The following scheme illustrates the position of S during the procedure, given an 
oracle for the (rn/21+ 1 )th bit (i.e., I = rn/21+ 1). We denote an unknown value 
of a bit by a question mark. All bits that are known a priori to be zero are denoted 
by a zero. Bits of S that were discovered or assigned values are denoted by an 
exclamation mark. The oracle’s location is indicated by a box: 
Before the procedure begins: 
7 . . . . . . . 3 ” 
After stages 2: 4 I- ra1ogn1 
Il. 0 
I’ 7 . . . . . . . . . . *.. ., 1 
During the procedure: 
n 
Finally: 
n 
r. 1 . . . ! . . . !I .?. . . . .., 0 . . . I " 
n 
I . . . . . . . ! . . . 0 . . . I Y 
PROPOSITION 3.2. Under the intractability assumption, for every i: 1 <i G 
rn/21- O(log n), the ith bit of fg,N is hard. 
Proof: Assume that for some 1 <i< [n/2] - O(log n), the ith bit is not hard. 
Remember that s=f~!,(f~,~(N)) and aa5c+ 10, where l/n” is the advantage of 
the oracle. For all cases, where i < rn/21- [a log nl, we use a simplified version of 
Procedure Forward-Extract, as explained in the following. Otherwise, we use the 
same proof as in Proposition 3.1. 
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Assume that i < rn/2] - ra log n]. As we shift S i bits to the left (stage 1 of Pro- 
cedure Forward-Extract, where i substitutes the (rn/2] - [a log n])-shift, we know 
that all the i- 1 least significant bits are zero. We can therefore extract the suc- 
cessive bits of S, by repeatedly performing stages 3-4 of Procedure Forward-Extract 
for all bits sj, 1 < j < [n/2] + 1. In this simplified version we need not try out all 
possible values of the least significant bits of S, whereas in Proposition 3.1 some of 
the bits of S remain to the oracle’s right after the initial shift, so that an exhaustive 
search cannot be avoided. 
To make the right shifts possible (after the first i shifts which merely move S back 
to its original position, but leave rn/21- i + 1 of the bits of S unknown) we must 
use the general right shift technique. We choose a random g,, create { gj}~!!~l~ ‘+ * 
with gj+ i = gf (mod N) and use g = grni2,- i+ z as the base of the exponentiation 
function. Since by Assumption a.2 squaring is a permutation over the admissible 
generators, randomly choosing g, will result in a random g, thus ensuring that the 
oracle is correct for g with a non-negligible probability. By the same arguments as 
before we obtain 
CLAIM 2.1. The Simpltfied Forward-Extract Procedure yields a single value for S. 
CLAIM 2.2. With probability at least Q(l/n’) the output is the correct value of S. 
CLAIM 2.3. The procedure can be used to factor a non-negligible fraction of the 
Blum integers with an overwhelming probability of success, by trying random 
admissible g,‘s. 
PROPOSITION 3.3. Under the intractability assumption, for every i: [n/21 + 
O(log n) 6 i 6 n - O(log n) the i th bit of fg,N is hard. 
Proof Assume that for some [n/21 + O(log n) Q i < n - O(log n), the i th bit is 
not hard. Remember that S = f,&!,(f,,N(N)) and ~12 5c + 10, where l/n’ is the 
advantage of the oracle. Again we use the answers of an oracle for that ith bit to 
derive S and subsequently factor N. For non-extreme left bits (i.e., for 
rn/21< i < (1 - E)n, for any constant E) it is possible to use Procedure Forward- 
Extract to extract successive En-bit blocks of S, as demonstrated in [SS2]. This 
method cannot be extended to arbitrary left i ‘s. Instead we must use Procedure 
Backward-Extract. 
Our first presentation of Procedure Backward-Extract was for an oracle located 
at the middle. We performed the left shifts without zeroing the recently discovered 
bits and ensured (by limiting the amount of left shifts that were performed) that this 
did not cause an overflow. In this proposition the oracle is located in an arbitrary 
left location, thus limiting the amount of left shifts (as done in Proposition 3.1) will 
leave many (too many to guess) bits of S unseen by the oracle. Here we must 
perform the left shifts as in the general shift to the left technique and adjust stage 3 
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of Procedure Backward-Extract accordingly. This makes it no longer clear that the 
length of the list Lj, as created by stage 4 of the procedure, does not grow exponen- 
tially with j, and the proof given for Proposition 3.1 no longer holds. 
Let I[, . . . . Ii denote the elements of the list Lj (i.e., the candidate values for the 
i left bits of S: CS/,, . . . . CS:,, ,ogn, ) ordered from the largest 1; to the smallest 1.;. 
(Note that each number in the list is smaller than 2.’ - 1.) We shall demonstrate 
how to handle the list in such a way that it is always the case that I{ - If < 2r”0g nl. 
To do this we show how to trim Lj whenever 2 rOr 108 ~1 < [{ _ 1; 6 2’” lOg rfl f 1. The 
Trimming Rule, that we shall present, will be used to adjust stage 4 in Procedure 
Backward-Extract as presented in the proof of Proposition 3.1. In Procedure 
Backward-Extract combined with the Trimming Rule, stage 4 will be replaced by 
the following: 
New Stage 4. Let L,j be the list containing the candidates values for the j left 
bits of S. Create a new list L,, L in the following manner: 
(a) Concatenate to the right of each candidate value 0 and 1, and order the 
resulting elements of Lj+ , from the largest 1;” to the smallest /i+‘. 
(b) ~f2r~lO~~i~~~+l~~~+l~2r~~“9~~if~, use the Trimming Rule repeatedly 
until you reach a list L.j+ ,, where the difference between the largest 
element and the smallest one is smaller than 2ra’og “. 
The key idea of the trimming is to check a certain bit of another secret S’, which 
is defined by 
22ra bgni 
s’= i 1 I( - 1; .ts-li.2r41+l ~‘). 
Define the crucial position by cp = rn/21 -j+ 2ra log nl + 1 (its importance will 
soon be evident). We now make two observations, which lead us to the following 
rule by which we trim L,. 
TRIMMING RULE. Shift S’ i- cp bits to the left. Deduce s&, by querying the 
oracle on t(n) random multiples gshifteds’ . gR (mod N), for R < e. Ifs& = 1, discard 
the candidate value Zi from the list L,. Otherwise discard 1J; from that list. 
Observations. 1. If the candidate value 1: indeed contains the j leftmost non- 
zero bits of S, then O,<S’<2 for log” . 2r”‘21 + ’ -j. In particular s& = 0, and also 
s&- 1, . . . . S:.p~r,logn,=O...O. 
2. If the candidate value 1’; indeed contains the i leftmost non-zero bits of S, 
then ~=22ralogn?+rfl/21+1~i+b 9 where 0~~<2r*i09~1.2r”/21+1-i \ . Therefore: 
s&, = 1, sb = 0 for q > cp, and also s&, , , . . . . s& ~ rar log n, = O... 0. 
These two observations together with a standard sampling argument imply that 
with high probability we will never discard a correct value and hence by similar 
arguments as before we can prove: 
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CLAIM 3.1. Procedure Backward-Extract combined with the Trimming Rule 
yields at most 2rr’ogn’ possible values for S. 
CLAIM 3.2. With probability greater than !C2( l/n“) one of the output values is the 
correct value of S. 
CLAIM 3.3. Procedure Backward-Extract combined with the Trimming Rule can 
be used to factor a non-negligible fraction of the Blum integers with an overwhelming 
probability of success, by trying random admissible g’s. 
PROPOSITION 3.4. Under the intractability assumption, the O(log n) most sign@ 
cant bits of fg,N are hard. 
Proof Let l/n’ be the advantage of the oracle in Definition H.2, and let 
c( 2 5c + 10 as before. First let us observe that if the bias of the bit in question is 
at most 1/2n’ (i.e., the probability of the bit being one is in the interval 
[(l -n-‘)/2, (1 + n-‘)/2]) then the methods of Proposition 3.3 will work. (We 
leave this verification to the reader.) Thus we will assume that the bias is at least 
1/2n’ and, in particular, m - i < c log n + 1, where m is the location of the leftmost 
non-zero bit in ord,( g). Also note that when the bias of the bit is exponentially 
close to one (which is the case for i > m), this bit is trivially hard by Definition H.2. 
Remember that we use an approximation e for ord,(g) (as defined in the presenta- 
tion of our randomization technique). 
Assume that for some m - clog n - 1 < id m the i th bit is not hard by 
Definition H.2. We will use the same outline of the reconstruction of S as in 
Proposition 3.3; i.e., we will use the oracle to determine if the shifted S’ is a number 
of the form 6 or 2’-’ + 6, where 0 < 6 d 2’- ’ -ra log” (if it is of neither form we do 
not care what happens). Problems arise since it is no longer true that asking the 
oracle questions about numbers of the form R + shifted S’ for a randomly chosen 
R between 0 and e will allow us to distinguish the two cases. 
By [SSl] the fact that there is an oracle for which the weighted success rate is 
significantly greater than two (proving the bit to be weak by Definition H.2) implies 
that there is another oracle for which the probabilities of correct one-answers and 
of erroneous one-answers significantly differ. For this oracle C there exists some 
constant c : 
IPr(C= 1 I xi= 1)-Pr(C= 1 1 x,=0)1 3 l/nc. 
Let I be the entire interval [0, e]. For any interval J let P,(J) the fraction of one- 
answers the oracle gives on J, i.e., P,(J) = Pr(C( g, IV, Z) = 1 1 .f;k(Z) E J). For any 
number a, let J+ a denote the interval created by shifting the points in J by a 
mod e. We will need the following key lemma: 
LEMMA 4.1. Zf there exists an interval J of length at least d such that 
IP,(J)- P1(J+2’-‘)I >20d-12’-‘-r”‘“g”1, then we can recouer S. 
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Proof: Assume without loss of generality that P,(J)- P,(J+ 2’- ‘) 2 
20d-‘2’- ’ -r”ognl. We will use the same procedure as in Proposition 3.3. The only 
difference is that instead of choosing a random R < e in the Trimming Rule we will 
choose a random REJ. We need only to check that, indeed, the Trimming Rule 
will not discard the correct candidate value for the bits of S; i.e., it is still possible 
to identify correctly when s& = 0 and when stCp = 1. If r{ contains the correct 
leftmost non-zero bits of S then the shifted S’ is of the form 2’- ’ -t 6, where 0 Q 6 d 
2’- ’ -ra’ognl. Thus when we choose R E J, R + shifted S’ lies in an interval whose 
symmetric difference with J+2’-’ is of size at most 2i-ra’ogn1. Therefore, the 
fraction of one-answers in this case is at most P,(J+2’-‘) +d- ‘2’+rz’0g”1. 
Similarly we obtain that if 1.; contains the correct value for the left bits of S then 
the fraction of one-answers is at least P,(J) - d- 2 ~ ’ i ra’ognl. We can tell these two 
cases apart if we query the oracle n . (P,(J) - P, (J + 2’ ~ I)) ~ 2 times. 
The proof will proceed by demonstrating the existence of a polynomial number 
of intervals such that Lemma 4.1 is true for one of these intervals. This interval can 
be identified by sampling and then used in the Trimming Rule. 
Divide Z into K=Le/2’-‘J+ 1 intervals I,, I,, . . . . I,, where Zi= [(j- 1) 2’-‘, 
j2’-’ - l] for j< K and ZK = [(K- 1)2’-‘, e]. Note that the i th bit of the integers 
in each interval is the same. We have two cases: 
1. There is a j<K-- 1 such that lP,(Z,)-P,(Z,+,)) an-“/20K. 
2. There is no such j. 
In case 1 we are done by Lemma 4.1 (since K is only polynomially large). 
The failure of case 1 implies that there is a q such that for all j< K, 
IPI -q( <n-“/20. To obtain the l/n’ difference in the overall behavior of the 
oracle we need jP,(Z,)-q] 24.2’-‘/5 lZ,l n” (the sign depending on the parity of 
K). Observe that this implies IZ,l> 4.2’- I/%‘. Define a new division of Z into 
T = r&/)1,1 1 intervals Z& . . . . I:, where Zj, = I, +12~~ ’ for 0 <j< T. We shall 
now prove that these intervals cover Z very nicely. In particular, I$“- ‘) has a 
common border with I:- ’ whose other border is Zg = I,: Let f0 be the number of 
intervals of the form Ii, 0 < j,< T to which a point a belongs. 
LEMMA 4.2. For any two points a, and a2 we have ) fo, - f,,l Q 2. 
Proof Since we are working modulo e we are basically on the circle and we 
have no problems with the border. The size of the circle is e which by definition 
equals (K - 1)2’- ’ + II,). We establish the lemma by using the following two 
claims: 
CLAIM 4.3. Ifa,sa,mod2’-‘then Ifa,-fa,l<l. 
CLAIM 4.4. Zf a2 <a, <a2 + 2’-’ then f,, - fa, < 1. 
The lemma clearly follows from these two claims. 
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To prove the first claim assume that a, = a2 + k2’- ‘, where 0 <k <K-- 1. Then 
it is true that u,EZ/O iff a EZ~O’~ and since it is not hard to see that neither of the 
points is in the inteKrmedi&e ktervals the claim follows. 
For the second claim, suppose that a, oZ$. Then we claim that a2EZs+k for 
some k of the form p(K- 1) and that a, 4 Z’, for j, < j < j, + k. This is clearly suf- 
ficient to establish the original claim. To see this later claim, observe that I$’ Kp ’ 
has its right endpoint coinciding with the left endpoint of Zi and, in general, 
Z$+P(K-l) has its right endpoint coinciding with the left endpoint of Z$+(P-l)(K- ‘I. 
Thus the first /I for which the left endpoint of Z$+B(Kp ‘) is to the left of a2 is the 
desired interval. To see that a, does not belong to any of the intermediate intervals, 
observe that the only Z$ to which it could belong are of the form 
j = j, + P(K- 1) + 1. However, if a, belongs to Zi then the left endpoint of Zi,- ’ is 
already to the left of a, and, hence, we have established the claim. 
Examining the new division of Z into T intervals Z&, that we have defined, we 
again have two cases: 
1. There is a j such that j < T such that IP,(Z’,) - P,(Z’,i ‘)I >, n-‘/20T. 
2. There is no such j. 
In case 1 we are again done by Lemma 4.1 (T is large but still polynomially 
bounded). All that remains is to prove that case 2 cannot happen. The fact that no 
j satisfying (1) exists implies that IP,(Z’,) - P,(Z,)l <n-‘/20 for all j. Now consider 
P,(Z): It is a weighted average of the P,(Zj) and thus IPI(qJ < 
4 IPI - ql + n-“/20 (using the assumption that lZ,l < 1 III). On the other hand, 
by Lemma 4.2 if we pick a random j and then pick a random point from Z’,, then 
each point is picked with a probability that is within a factor (1 + 2/n2c) of the 
probability it would have been picked by uniform distribution. This fact implies 
that 
P,(z)-~~~lP,(z~) G-g 
I=0 
which, together with the assumption that we are in case 2, implies 
and we have reached a contradiction which completes the proof of Proposi- 
tion 3.4. 1 
4. THE SIMULTANEOUSLY HARD BITS OF fg,N 
In the following section we define the strong notion of simultaneous hardness, 
which states that it is computationally hard to succeed in computing any informa- 
tion whatsoever about groups of bits of fg,,,. We then show that fR,,, is indeed 
secure in that sense. 
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DEFINITION. pf: [l, N] -+ (0, 1)” -I+’ is the function p:(U)=uu,, . . ..u., with 
k> j. 
DEFINITION H.3. The bits of & at locations j d i d k are simultaneously hard, 
if (pF(f,Ih(Z)), 2) is polynomially indistinguishable from (r:, Z) for randomly 
chosen admissible (g, N, Z) and a random R = r;. 
DEFINITION H.4. A non-biased i th bit, j < i < k, of the function fg,N is relatively 
hard to the right (to the left) in the interval [j, k] if no family of polynomial-size 
Boolean circuits can, given a random admissible triplet (g, N, Z) and, in addition, 
the i-k (j-i, respectively) bits of f$(Z) to its right (left), compute the i th bit 
of f;;(Z) with probability of success greater than $ + l/poly(n), for any polyno- 
mial poly(n). 
DEFINITION H.5. The i th bit, j < i < k, of the function fg,N, xi, is relatively hard 
to the right (to the left) in the interval [j, k] if for every family C of polynomial-size 
Boolean circuits which is given a random admissible triplet (g, N, Z) and in 
addition the i-k (j,- i, respectively) bits of f,;;(Z) to its right (left): ws(C, xi) < 
2 + O(v(n)). 
PROPOSITION 4. The following conditions are equivalent : 
1. The bits of fg,* at locations j < i < k are simultaneously hard. 
2. Each bit j,< i < k of f,-;(Z) is relatively hard to the right in the interval 
Li, kl. 
3. Each bit j < i < k of f,;;(Z) is relatively hard to the left in the interval 
Cj, kl. 
The proof of this equivalence for non-biased bits is basically the well-known 
proof of the universality of the next bit test [Y]. This hybrid proof technique is 
explained in [BH] and is therefore omitted. For biased bits, where Definition H.5 
should be used, the proof of this equivalence is given in [SSl] and is also omitted. 
THEOREM 5. Under the intractability assumption, the rn/2J + O(log n) right-hand 
bits Of .fqf,, N are simultaneously hard. 
THEOREM 6. Under the intractability assumption, the rn/21+ O(log n) left-hand 
bits off,, N are simultaneously hard. 
Proof of Theorem 5. It suffices to show that every right-hand bit of fg,N is 
relatively hard to the right in the interval [O, [n/2] + O(log n)] by Definition H.4. 
In general, even if each bit is individually hard, it does not immediately imply the 
simultaneous hardness of all bits: In order to use an oracle for a relatively weak to 
the right i th bit, all the i- 1 least significant bits of the unknown value must be 
supplied too, a very hard task is general. 
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Let X=f;i(Z). Assume that the theorem is false, i.e., for some 1 <i < [n/21 + 
O(log n) there exists an oracle C( g, N, Z, x{- ‘) (for admissible triplets) that suc- 
ceeds in predicting xi with probability f + E, for some non-negligible E. We extract 
the bits of the half-sized S=f;i( Y), where Y= gN (mod N), using Procedure 
Forward-Extract in exactly the same way as in Theorem 3 (either directly or in its 
simplified version, according to the location of i). The only difference is in the 
queries to the oracle, where we have to supply the i- 1 least significant bits of the 
argument. By examining both versions, it is easy to see that after the initial shift to 
the left and for each subsequent right shift and bit-zeroing of S (corresponding to 
a certain transformed value Y’ of Y) the i- 1 least significant bits of f$,,( Y’) are 
zero. Therefore the i - 1 least significant bits of Y’ . gR are the known bits of R, 
rip’, which can be given to the oracle. 1 
Proof of Theorem 6. We first deal with the non-biased left-hand bit of fg,N (up 
to the O(log n) most significant bits). As in Theorem 5, it suffices to show that every 
non-biased left-hand bit of fg,N is relatively hard to the left in the interval 
[[n/2] - O(log n), n - O(log n)] by Definition H.4. Let X=&$(Z). Assume that 
the theorem is false; i.e., for some rn/21- O(log n) < i 6 n - O(log n) there exists an 
oracle C(g, N, Z, x1+ ,) (for admissible triplets) that succeeds in predicting xi with 
probability 4 + E, for some non-negligible E. By examining the proof of Proposi- 
tion 3.3 it seems plausible to use Procedure Backward-Extract combined with the 
Trimming Rule. That ensures before any queries are made to the oracle through 
randomization that all the bits left of the oracle’s location are zero. Therefore it 
seems that the left bits that should be supplied to the oracle in every query are 
simply the left bits of the exponent of the random multiplier. Unfortunately that is 
not true! During the randomization we ensure that with high probability no carry 
reaches the oracle’s location. However, there may be a carry from the i th bit into 
the (i + 1)th bit (which is given as input to the oracle) and its existence depends on 
the value of the unknown bit of S’ in the Trimming Rule. 
We solve this problem by performing the randomization with random values 
R < e such that ri= 0. In that case we are indeed guaranteed that in every query 
the bits left of the oracle’s location are those of the random R. However, now we 
cannot determine the value of the i th bit simply by taking a majority vote, since 
it might not be the case that the oracle has any advantage over f in correctly 
predicting the ith bit (based on the bits to its left) on half of the possible values as 
determined by our randomization. Since the oracle has an overall s-advantage, we 
know that 
Pr(C(g, N, Z, xr+~)=xi)-Pr(C(g, N, Z, x?+I) #xi) 226. 
Note that 
Pr(C(g, N, Z, xl+ l)=Xi) 
=Pr(C(g,N,Z,x;+I)=l Ixj=l).Pr(xi=l) 
+ Pr(C( g, N, Z, x1+ I) = 0 1 xi = 0). Pr(xi = 0). 
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Similarly, 
PrWk, N, 2, x:+ ,) # XJ 
=Pr(C(g,N,Z,x;+,)=l Ixi=O).Pr(x,=O) 
We deal with non-biased bits; i.e., Pr(x,= 0) = Pr(xi= 1) = 4. It therefore follows 
that there exists a value u E (0, 1 }: 
It is possible to perform a priori tests on C (using inputs with known xl) to deter- 
mine u and the corresponding two probabilities. Thus, instead of using the answers 
of the oracle to perform a majority vote, we estimate the relative frequency of the 
v-answers with accuracy greater than E. (It is again easy to see that l(n) queries are 
sufficient.) By that we can derive the unknown value of xi. 
Note that, as we have already observed, when performing the randomization for 
the Trimming Rule if none of the extreme values in the list (ZJ; and I{) are the 
correct candidates, then we are not guaranteed that the rcr log n] bits right to s& 
are zero and a carry may reach the oracle’s location. We may, therefore, obtain that 
the frequency of u-answers is altogether different from the two a priori measured 
probabilities. In that case both values can be discarded from the list. 
To extend the proof to the biased bits (using Definition H.5) we have to be 
slightly careful. Using the notations of the proof of Proposition 3.4 let I,, . . . . Z, be 
the division of the interval I= [O, e] into K= Le/2’-‘_I + 1 intervals, where 
Zj= [(j- 1)2’-I, j2”- l] for j< K and Z,= [(K- 1) 2'-', e]. 
Assume that the fraction of the oracle’s one-answers is significantly different (i.e., 
the difference is at least l/poly(n) for a suitable polynomial poly(n)) on ZTj+, and 
Z,,,, for any j when the correct bits for the left it - i positions are given to the 
oracle. These bits are basically j with n - m + 1 zeros concatenated to its left. In this 
case we are done by the same reasoning as in Lemma 4.1 (there are only polyno- 
mially many possibilities so we can try them all). 
The only case where the above assumption does not hold is when K is even and 
most of the oracles advantage is when the left n-i bits take their maximal value. 
Now create a “new” oracle C’ by always feeding this maximal value of the n - i bits 
to our original oracle (no matter if they are correct or not). For an interval J let 
P;(J) denote the fraction of one-answers given by C’ on inputs from .Z (and the left 
bits always being this maximal value). Note that by assumption P;(Z,) and 
P;(Z,- ,) are substantially different. Looking more closely at the proof of Proposi- 
tion 3.4 it is possible to see that one of the following statements is true: 
1. There is a j< K such that P,(Z,- i) and P,(Zj) are substantially different. 
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2. There is a j< T such that P,(l’,- ‘) and P,(I’,) are substantially different. 
Using again the proof techniques presented in the proof of Proposition 3.3 it is 
straightforward to prove the theorem also in this case. 1 
5. APPLICATIONS 
5.1. Commitment Schemes 
Several cryptographic schemes require a party to commit to a certain message 
without revealing any information on the content of the message. The message is 
drawn out of an arbitrary collection, which may be very sparse. Most known com- 
mitment schemes are designed to hide a single bit. Multi-bit commitment improves 
the efficiency of existing protocols as presented in [KMO]. Recently Naor has 
presented a multi-bit commitment scheme [Na] using any pseudo-random bit 
generator. We construct a different scheme that uses j& directly. 
The simultaneous hardness of the rn/2] right-hand bits of &, implies that fg,N 
hides [n/2] uniformly distributed bits. To use fg,,, in a multi-bit commitment 
scheme, it should be proven that fg,,, hides O(n) arbitrarily distributed bits in a 
polynomially secure manner. We now formally define the notion of simultaneous 
hardness with respect to non-uniform probability distributions, prove that most of 
our results still hold under these distributions, and construct a simple multi-bit 
commitment scheme accordingly. 
DEFINITION. NU(g, N, Z) denotes any probability distribution function of 
admissible triplets in which: 
1. g and N are uniformly distributed. 
2. Let A’= f;;(Z). The distribution of Z is induced by any probability 
distribution P(X) in which: 
(4 xr,i217 -y x1 are arbitrarily distributed, and 
(b) X,9 -~Xr,/zl+ t are uniformly distributed (in the range determined by 
X< m-d,&)). 
DEFINITION H.6. The i th bit, 1 < i < rn/2], of the function fg,N is non-uniformly 
hard (NU-hard) if no family of polynomial-size Boolean circuits can, given a 
random NU-distributed admissible triplet (g, N, Z), compute the i th bit of f;;(Z) 
with probability of success greater than $ + l/poly(n), for any polynomial poly(n). 
DEFINITION H.7. The k right-most bits of fg,,, are simultaneously NU-hard, if 
Mf-~&m Z) is polynomially indistinguishable from (xf, Z), for any NU- 
distributed admissible (g, N, Z) and P-distributed X= x;. 
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THEOREM 7. Under the intractability assumption, the rn/2J right-hand bits qf‘,fi, ,V 
are simultaneously NU-hard. In particular, for every 1 < i < [n/2] the i th bit of’.fK, ,, 
is NU-hard. 
ProoJ The proof of the theorem is essentially a non-uniform version of the 
proof of Theorem 5. If the theorem is false then in particular there exists a certain 
assignment, A, for the rn/21 right-hand bits of fg,,, such that (A, fR,N(r;,jz,+, .‘A)) 
is polynomially distinguishable from (A, Z), where (g, N, Z) is a NU-distributed 
admissible triplet, and R is a randomly chosen string, s.t. r;,,z,+, 0,4 < ord,(g). As 
we shall prove, Theorem 5 can be strengthen to show that for any specific rn/2l-bit 
message, 4 (4fg.N(r;n,2,+1 0A)) is polynomially indistinguishable from (A, Z) for 
uniformly distributed admissible (g, N, Z) and a random R which is defined as 
above. Exploiting once again the fact that we work in the non-uniform complexity 
model leads to the conclusion that the same holds when the admissible (g, N, Z) is 
NU-distributed. 
To prove the strengthened version of Theorem 5, assume that there exists an 
assignment, A, for which (A, f,, JrFni2, + , 0 A)) is polynomially distinguishable from 
(A, Z), for the above defined arguments, Using the hybrid proof technique [BH] 
it is possible to show that if this distinguishability holds then there exists a certain 
1 d id rn/21 such that (A, fg,,,(r:+, 0 af )) is polynomially distinguishable from 
64 &,dr:IOa, ‘-I)), where ai denotes the i rightmost bits of A. For this i there exists 
an oracle C(g, N, A, f,,,(rroaf ’ )) (constructed using D) that predicts the i th bit 
of the random (and therefore unknown) R with probability greater than ++E 
[BH]. We complete the proof by using the oracle C to extract the bits of 
S =f,rA( Y) with Y =fg,N (N). For that we use Procedure Forward-Extract directly 
or in its simplified version (according to i, as in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2) with spe- 
cial attention to combining A in the queries to the oracle. Both versions ensure that 
after the initial shift and guess all the bits right to the i th bit in the argument of 
the transformed Y (denoted Y’) are zero. The oracle requires, however, that those 
bits be the right bits of A. Our queries to the oracle will therefore be: 
(g, N, A, Y’ g’:. g”; ’ (mod N)), f or random R < e. It is easy to see that indeed this 
procedure can be used to factor a non-negligible fraction of the Blum integers with 
an overwhelming probability of success, which by the intractability assumption 
leads to the desired contradiction. i 
Note that, unlike previous proofs, this proof relies on the use of the non-uniform 
complexity model. However, even this theorem can be proven in the uniform com- 
plexity model under the additional assumption that the distribution P(X) (and 
therefore NU( g, N, Z)) is polynomially samplable (as in [ILL]). Note also that 
under the appropriate definition of NU( g, N, Z), Theorem 7 is the exact analogue 
of Theorem 5 (with rn/21+ O(log n) simultaneously NU-hard bits). 
By Theorem 7 it is possible to commit to a rn/2)bit value A4 by choosing 
randomly N and g, picking a uniformly distributed R s.t. $JHlz7 +, 0 MC ord,(g), 
and sending Z = f,. N(r;,,,, + I 0 M), where 0 denotes concatenation. In particular, 
the theorem implies that the existence of even a single pair of messages (chosen 
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by the opponent) whose committed values can be efficiently distinguished will lead 
to the factorization of N. 
COROLLARY 7.1. Let MO, M, E (0, l> rni27 be any pair of rn/2J-bit messages. 
Let Zj=fg,N(Y;n/2~+1 0 Mj), j= 0, 1, with R’ a un$ormly distributed string such 
that r;n,2, + 1 o M, < ord,( g). Then, (Mj, Zi) and ( Mj, Z, _ ,) are polynomially 
indistinguishable. 
Note that the conditions of practical commitment schemes are somewhat dif- 
ferent from the underlining conditions of our previous proofs: In these proofs we 
can try out various values for g and ensure that at least one of them is of high 
order and that at least one of our guesses for its order is correct. However, when 
we use fg,N in practice, we must guarantee that a randomly chosen generator g has 
high order (which happens with high probability), if we are to count on the security 
of fg,,,. Furthermore, it is necessary not only to verify that g is of high order, but 
to know the exact order of the generator (to ensure and prove that R has been 
chosen correctly). Recall that ordN(g) divides (P - l)(Q - 1). Thus in practice the 
factorization of (P - l)(Q - 1) must be known to the party that chooses the 
commitment scheme, by carefully choosing the primes. For that we use the 
probabilistic algorithm, suggested by Bach [Ba2], which enables us to choose an 
integer together with its prime factorization, with uniform probability distribution 
among the n-bit integers. By repeating this procedure sufficiently many times, an 
integer which is smaller by one than a prime can be found with overwhelming 
probability. 
5.2. Pseudo-Random Bit Generation 
Any one-way function can be used for the construction of a pseudo-random bit 
generator, due to the recent results of [ILL, H]. However, the general techniques 
are very inefficient. The simple construction of [BM] is inapplicable to fg,N, since 
for composite N it is not one to one. fg,N is also not regular (i.e., not every possible 
value has the same number of preimages); hence even the (inefficient) construction 
of [GKL] cannot be used. We are interested in an efficient construction, using the 
simultaneous hardness of rn/2] bits of fg,N to output as many bits as possible in 
every stage of the generation. 
Using the Leftover Hash Lemma, presented in [ILL, IZ], we give a construction 
of a perfect extender E: { 0, 1 } 3n + (0, 1 } 3sn - o(‘0g2 “I: For uniformly distributed 3n- 
bit inputs, E generates an ensemble which is polynomially indistinguishable from 
the uniformly distributed ensemble of [3Sn - 0(log2 n)]-bit strings. The pseudo- 
random bit generation is achieved through repeated applications of the extender to 
a random seed (as demonstrated in [BH] ). 
Let N = P. Q be a Blum integer of size n and let g be an admissible high order 
generator. Let n - O(log n) <m <n - 2 be an integer such that 2” < ord,(g) < 
2 m + ‘. As before, P and Q must be carefully chosen using Bach’s algorithm. Let H,,, 
be a family of universal hash functions, where t = m - log’ n. It is well known that 
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2n bits sufice to define a unique function hi H,,, (see, for example, [IZ], where 
some simple constructions are demonstrated). Let h be a randomly chosen function 
in K, and let X be a random n-bit string. Let x \“/” denote the rn/2] right-hand 
bits of X (mod ord,(g)) and let 0 denote concatenation. The extender E is 
Note. The fact that O(n) bits of fg,N are simultaneously secure and not just 
O(log n) is crucial for the construction of E. Applying the hash function causes a 
log* n-bit loss in the length of E’s output. The final O(n) extension is possible only 
because of the many simultaneously hard bits, which more than compensate for this 
loss. 
THEOREM 8. E is a perfect extender. 
Proof The proof is a direct result of the following two lemmas. 
LEMMA 8.1. For randomly chosen h 0 X, h 0 h(f,, N (A’)) is polynomially 
indistinguishable from a randomly chosen (2n + t)-bit string. 
Proof: The hash functions are defined on the set G, of elements in Zz that can 
be expressed as powers of g. In our construction the distribution of the elements in 
G is induced by a uniform probability distribution of X. Clearly, by definition of 
ord,k): 
pjz { -log(Pr(Z))} = log(ord,(g)) > m 
The lemma is then a straightforward application of the Leftover Hash Lemma 
[ILL, IZ]. 
LEMMA 8.2. x:“~” are simultaneously secure given h 0 h( f,, N (A’)). 
Proof Identical to the proof of Theorem 5. The only difference results from the 
fact that the inputs to the oracle are not admissible triplets but g, N, h, h(fg,N(X)). 
Note that the fact that m is made public (through the publication of the range of 
h) does not detract from the hardness of x1 rni2’ since it can be guessed in polynomial 
time (indeed we guess m in our shifting and randomization techniques). 1 
6. DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have explored some of the unique properties of exponentiation 
modulo a Blum integer, which make it the first number-theoretic function, all of 
whose bits are proven to be individually hard and half of whose bits are proven to 
be simultaneously hard. The results presented in this paper can be extended in 
several directions: 
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1. It is interesting to see which mixed groups of bits from the right and left 
half of fg,N can be proven to be simultaneously hard. We can show that the bits of 
the complement of every window of length Ln/2 J are simultaneously secure; i.e., for 
every 1 <j< rn/2] the rightmost j bits together with the leftmost rn/2] -j bits are 
simultaneously secure. In particular, the rightmost rn/4] bits, together with the 
leftmost [n/4] bits, are simultaneously secure. 
2. The factorization of Blum integers may remain intractable even if some of 
the bits of P and Q are known. Efficient factorization techniques are known only 
when at least [n/3] bits of P or Q are given [RS]. Assume that the factorization 
of Blum integes remains computationally hard even when we are given the Ln/4J 
leftmost non-zero bits of P or Q. Under this strengthened intractability assumption 
it is easy to show that three-quarters of the bits of fg,N are simultaneously secure, 
as the length of the unknown part of S is now only rn/4] + 1 instead of rn/21+ 1. 
3. Let F denote any set of composites for which it is assumed that it is com- 
putationally hard to distinguish Blum integers from the numbers in F (and thus, in 
particular, it is difficult to factor these numbers). Such a set is, for example, the set 
of all composites N which are the products of a small number of large primes. Since 
the set F and the set of Blum integers are polynomially indistinguishable by our 
assumption, our results hold not only for Blum integers but for all F as well, even 
though our proof techniques are not directly applicable to numbers in F. This 
generalization was first observed by Silvio Micali (personal communication). 
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